In June 1993, the Russian General Staff warned of escalating tensions over the unresolved status of the Black Sea Fleet (ChF), driven by Ukraine's territorial claims over Crimea and control of fleet assets. Disputes over the division of the fleet and its infrastructure, compounded by Ukrainian efforts to assert authority over ChF personnel and facilities, risked destabilizing regional security. The memo advised that Russia should push firmly for joint control of fleet infrastructure and, if necessary, question Crimea's 1954 transfer to Ukraine, while using diplomatic efforts to highlight the risks of ongoing deadlock.

As of April 1993, Western observers expressed growing concern over Ukraine's inconsistent stance on nuclear disarmament, particularly its hesitation to ratify START-1 and join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Ukraine's conditional approach to denuclearization was criticized as extortionate, risking strained relations with the West and delaying global disarmament efforts. While some countries supported Ukraine's position, most Western governments urged restraint and flexibility, emphasizing the need for international coordination, while recognizing Russia’s limited options in resolving the issue.

Between 1991 and 1993, Crimea's political status became a source of conflict with Ukraine, as Crimean authorities pursued declarations of sovereignty and independence, while Ukraine asserted its territorial integrity. After initial moves toward secession, including plans for an independence referendum and the adoption of a separate constitution, tensions were partially eased when Crimea introduced a constitution acknowledging its status within Ukraine. However, debates over autonomy and governance continued, with further legislative developments pending in 1993.

By mid-1993, tensions over control of the Black Sea Fleet (ChF) escalated sharply due to Ukrainian attempts to assert authority over the fleet, provoking protests and defections to Russian command, particularly in Sevastopol and Crimea. The crisis stems from the stalled implementation of the 1992 Yalta Agreement, which outlined shared Russian-Ukrainian oversight, while competing national interests and rising nationalist pressures have blocked a clear resolution. With local unrest growing and no firm diplomatic progress, the situation risks further destabilization without an urgent legal and political settlement at the highest levels.

Boris Yeltsin writes to Kravchuk urging Ukraine to follow through with the implementation of START-1 as discussed per their negotiations in Moscow. He says that Russia will not recognize Ukraine's property right to nuclear weapons in Ukrainian territory and that Ukraine cannot use CIS structures to control its nuclear forces.To aid in the recycling of nuclear warheads in Ukraine, Yeltsin offers Russian assistance.

In a report to the Verkhovna Rada, Tolubko discusses three national security issues. He argues that Ukraine should either develop its own nuclear weapons industry or operate Ukrainian nuclear weapons jointly with Russia. He suggests that Ukraine should try to preserve its status as a space nation and should lease the naval base in Crimea to Russia.

At the opening of negotiations with Russia on the elimination of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kostenko discusses Ukraine's main concerns: ensuring reliable operation and storage of nuclear warheads in Ukraine until their liquidation, maintaining the Armed Forces of the CIS' control over the operation of Ukraine's nuclear arms, and the recognition that all weapons on Ukrainian territory or removed to Russia after independence belong to Ukraine which will determine how and where to safely dismantle them.