Eighty-seven years after the Suez Canal’s completion in 1869 and less than two months after the last British troops had left it in June 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) on July 26, 1956, nationalized the Suez Canal Company.

Nasser announced the step in the text printed here: a speech that would become a classic in the annals of twentieth-century decolonization worldwide. The English translation used here is included in a documentary publication printed in 1956 by the US State Department in Washington, DC, titled The Suez Canal Problem; it is an excerpt of the whole speech.

Nasser pronounced the speech in the Egyptian Mediterranean city of Alexandria in front of a crowd of tens of thousands, during which he also uttered the code word signaling his security forces to occupy the company’s assets and offices in Egypt. Nasser’s step took the world by surprise. The French government, the Suez Canal Company’s Paris headquarters and its many French shareholders, and the British government that was the company’s largest shareholder and that on July 23, following Washington’s lead, had retracted a 1955 offer to back a World Bank loan to Egypt: all they were outraged. (France and Britain would fail to reverse nationalization in court; the outcome, in Britain, of the ensuing Franco-British-Israeli attack is the focus of another document dated 1956 in this collection). Diametrically opposed was the dominant reaction among Egyptians, other Arabs, and people in newly independent and still colonialized countries. They were ecstatic. The reason was not so much that Nasser nationalized the canal in order to find a new way to finance a dam at Aswan, on the Nile, although that project was a linchpin of Egypt’s modernization, a history analyzed in Guy Laron’s Origins of the Suez Crisis (2013). The reason was more existential. Nasser’s act turned himself, Egypt, and by proxy the entire non-white world from a passive object of history into an active subject. “Die of your fury,” Nasser told the Americans, and by extension Europe’s descending imperial powers. And by calling the shots—“Today, citizens, the Suez Canal Company has been nationalized. This order has been published in the Official Journal. It has become a matter of fact”—he symbolically subjugated Britain and France, humiliating those once so powerful empires as only a non-white ex-colonial subject could. Even a cut as historic as India’s independence, in 1947, had not hurt Britain this much. Technically speaking Britain had co-initiated that final act of the British Raj, and it was a loss of a limb, however crucial. Nasser, by contrast, had stabbed the empire in its very heart—a story classically narrated in Keith Kyle’s Suez (1991).

Khrushchev and UAR Prime Minister Ali Sabri met to discuss recent developments in Africa, the Middle East, and global imperialism. They reviewed efforts to strengthen Arab and African unity, the ongoing conflicts in Cyprus, Yemen, and the Congo, and growing US military interventions, particularly in Vietnam. Khrushchev affirmed Soviet support for Arab states in their struggle against imperialism, while the two leaders also explored expanded Soviet assistance for agricultural development in the UAR.

This document records a 1964 conversation between Nikita Khrushchev and Ali Sabri, Prime Minister of the United Arab Republic (Egypt), regarding the escalating tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Both leaders express concern over British military presence on Cyprus, with Khrushchev emphasizing support for Cypriot neutrality and territorial integrity, and criticizing Greek actions against Turkish Cypriots. The discussion reflects shared interest in removing foreign bases from the island while managing regional stability.

On May 3, 1961, Nikita Khrushchev met with a delegation from the United Arab Republic (UAR) led by Anwar Sadat. The meeting began with expressions of gratitude and solidarity, highlighting Soviet support for UAR independence and its struggle against imperialism, particularly in relation to the construction of the Aswan Dam and resistance to Western aggression in the Middle East. Khrushchev emphasized the superiority of socialism and communism, advocating the Soviet model as an example for nations striving for independence and progress. Sadat expressed appreciation for Soviet assistance and raised concerns about the financial burden of purchasing weapons from the USSR. He requested a reduction in the price, citing UAR’s commitments to supporting anti-imperialist struggles across Africa and Asia. Khrushchev acknowledged the UAR’s vital role in the global anti-colonial movement but maintained that the USSR could not lower its weapons prices due to its own economic constraints and the need for consistency in its aid policies. Despite these limitations, Khrushchev promised to explore alternative ways to assist the UAR. The conversation concluded with mutual respect and reaffirmation of Soviet-UAR solidarity.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

This issue features a copy of the telegram that Mao Zedong sent to Gamal Abdel Nasser when he won the Egyptian presidential election. It also includes messages that the Prime Minister of Cambodia, Khim Tit, exchanged with Zhou Enlai after their respective countries signed an economic aid agreement. Other sections discuss checking the implementation of the First Five-Year Plan, educational matters, funded medical treatment for retired state agency employees, and various provincial administrative concerns, such as transferring districts from Jiangxi to Anhui Province.

In this issue, Zhou Enlai congratulates Gamal Abdel Nasser on the final withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt. Several sections cover factory safety and various administrative concerns, such as dividing Inner Mongolia into different banners.

As with the previous issue, this one continues to discuss Sino-Egyptian relations and includes an invitation from Zhou Enlai for Gamal Abdel Nasser to visit China. Peng Dehuai also extends an invitation to the Egyptian Minister of Defense, Abdel Hakim Amer. Other sections cover teaching plans for normal or pedagogical schools (including early education), the cultural and entertainment tax, and various provincial administrative concerns.

This issue announces the establishment of official Sino-Egyptian relations and features a letter that Zhou Enlai wrote to Gamal Abdel Nasser. Other sections discuss mobilizing young people to plant trees, holding national university entrance exams, and preparing for Children's Day.

Khrushchev discusses the Soviet Union's plans to build a communist society, emphasizing advancements in industrial and agricultural development and the application of Marxist-Leninist principles. Nkrumah, expressing Ghana’s commitment to socialism and African unity, requests Soviet economic, military, and technical aid to strengthen Ghana’s economy and support liberation movements across Africa. Khrushchev reaffirms the USSR's anti-colonial stance, agreeing to study Ghana’s proposals while also suggesting trade as a foundation for sustainable economic collaboration. The leaders discuss specific initiatives, including support for partisan training centers and potential Soviet assistance for Ghana’s infrastructure, highlighting shared aspirations for global peace and the advancement of socialism.

Nikita Khrushchev and Mohammed Daoud Kahn discuss construction in Moscow, territorial disputes with Iran over the waters of the Helmand River, Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan, the 14 July Revolution in Iraq, the Soviet Union's relations with Egypt, and the formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958.