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Documents

1946

Letter, Ya. Malik to Cde. V.M. Molotov

In this undated memo, written sometime after July 1946, Malik informs Molotov that he has completed a new draft directive for the Soviet delegation in the Joint Soviet-American Commission cconcerning Korea.

February 1974

Record of Discussions and Conversations between Cde. L. I. Brezhnev and Cde. F. Castro and Other Cuban Leaders, 29 January-2 February 1974

This document contains records of three conversations had between L. I. Brezhnev and Fidel Castro during Brezhnev's visit to Cuba. Castro welcomes Brezhnev to Cuba and the two leaders clearly state the friendship felt between their countries. They also speak about the political and economic situations of Cuba and the USSR, Soviet military aid to Cuba, conflict in the Middle East and Africa, and socialist movements in Latin America.

May 31, 1946

Report on the Work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission to Implement the Moscow Decision of the Three Ministers concerning Korea

The Soviet delegation proposed procedures for the work of the Joint Commission on Korea and the terms for consultation with parties and public organization; specifically, it called for the Commission to consult and only listen to parties and organizations of Korea that agreed with the Moscow Decision. The American delegation refused this demand, causing lengthy disputes. A list of parties and public organizations from both South Korea and North Korea for the consultation were drawn, but the right-wing parties in the Democratic Chamber, the administrative body of South Korea, opposed the Moscow decision and Joint Commission decision, and the discussion associated with the formation of a Provisional Korean Government was halted.

December 6, 1946

Report from General-Colonel T. Shtykov to Cde. I.V. Stalin and Cde. V.M. Molotov

Shytkov concludes that the Soviet delegation cannot back down from its demands for the parties in Korea to support the Moscow decision. A reversal of this position, Shtykov writes, would lead to the domination of US-backed, right-wing parties to take control over the Provisional Government of Korea.

April 20, 1960

Record of a Conversation [between] Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Walter Nash, Prime Minister of New Zealand, on the Shore of the Caucasus (Pitsunda)

This record of a conversation between Nikita Khrushchev and New Zealand Prime Minister Walter Nash, held on April 20, 1960, covers various international issues, including disarmament, the Cold War, German reunification, and the status of West Berlin. Nash praises Khrushchev’s peace proposals and emphasizes the importance of disarmament and peaceful coexistence. Khrushchev reiterates the Soviet Union's commitment to disarmament but expresses frustration with Western nations' resistance to concrete agreements. The two leaders discuss the need for mutual trust and the challenge of resolving intricate diplomatic issues. Khrushchev outlines Soviet plans for Germany, advocating peace treaties with both East and West Germany while proposing that West Berlin become a "free city." The conversation ends with Khrushchev agreeing to review cases of New Zealand residents seeking to reunite with family in the USSR. Both leaders express mutual respect and appreciation for the dialogue.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

August 10, 1959

Comments of N.S. Khrushchev

In this document, N. S. Khrushchev provides wide-ranging comments on various geopolitical and diplomatic issues. He criticizes the US for holding onto outdated alliances like Taiwan, emphasizing the need to normalize relations and reduce tensions globally. Khrushchev discusses Middle Eastern instability, particularly in Iran, warning against U.S. interference and emphasizing self-determination for colonized nations. He also addresses disarmament, arguing that military bases are a source of tension and advocating for a phased withdrawal of troops and arms control measures. Additional topics include the complexities of summit diplomacy, Lend-Lease repayment disputes, and his correspondence with world leaders such as Macmillan, De Gaulle, and Nehru, stressing the importance of aligning messages to maintain good relations.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

August 10, 1959

N.S. Khrushchev’s Views on the Content of a Memorandum [about a Peace Treaty with Germany]

N. S. Khrushchev outlines his perspective on negotiating with the United States regarding a peace treaty with Germany, emphasizing the need to address the division between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). He critiques Western policies that led to Germany's division and proposes signing a peace treaty with the GDR, while reassuring the U.S. that this action is not a threat to West Berlin. Khrushchev also touches on broader geopolitical issues, such as parallels with divided Korea and Vietnam, the significance of trade as a diplomatic barometer, and the importance of resolving tensions surrounding Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. Throughout, he encourages a phased approach to negotiations, stressing mutual understanding to avoid exacerbating international tensions.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

September 15, 1981

Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Instructions for the U.S. delegation to the IAEA's annual General Conference (GC) which told them to anticipate a “severe attack” against Israel by objecting “vigorously [to] suspension of technical aid.” Later on, this instruction would change, and the delegation would be instructed to leave the building should the Israeli credentials be rejected.

June 7, 1981

Attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Research Centre, 7 June 1981: Statement by the Director General

After the raid Israel initiated a PR campaign, explaining its reasoning behind the attack. Following this campaign, the second causality of the raid, in addition to Iraq’s reactor, was the credibility of the IAEA. And its officials staged their own counter campaign.

August 13, 1982

Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Secretary Weinberger, ‘Weekly Report of Defense Activities’

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger openly conveyed his dismay toward the Israeli leadership, expressing his support for the opposition, led by Shimon Peres.

Pagination