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October 13, 1973

From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with US Secretary of State H. Kissinger, 13 October 1973'

Ambassador Dobrynin passes a message from Brezhnev about the Arab-Israeli war to Nixon and Kissinger.

October 12, 1973

From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with US Secretary of State H. Kissinger, 12 October 1973'

Kissinger and Dobrynin discuss the roles of China and Great Britain in the Middle East conflict. Kissinger says the United States has intelligence suggesting that Soviet armed forces will intervene in the war. Dobrynin accuses Israel of "barbaric" behavior in the conflict.

October 10, 1973

From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with US Secretary of State H. Kissinger, 10 October 1973'

Dobrynin conveys the latest Soviet position on the Arab-Israeli war to Kissinger. He says that the Soviet Union supports the Arab countries in their "just struggle" but also that the United States and USSR should work together to achieve a ceasefire.

October 9, 1973

From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with US Secretary of State H. Kissinger, 9 October 1973'

During two conversations, Kissinger accuses the Soviet Union of urging Jordan to join the war against Israel. Dobrynin believes that Nixon and Kissinger are "clearly nervous" and suggests that the United States could decide to directly intervene in the Arab-Israeli war.

October 6, 1973

From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with US Secretary of State H. Kissinger, 6 October 1973'

Dobrynin summarizes two conversations with Henry Kissinger about the conflict between Israel and Egypt and Syria. Kissinger claims that the Soviet Union knew in advance of the Arab intention to go to war.

December 5, 1961

Report from Seán Ronan to Con Cremin (Dublin), ‘Irish Resolution on Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’ (Confidential), New York [Excerpt]

Aiken drafted in additional personnel to the Irish Mission to the UN in the run-in to the XVIth UN Session. Seán Ronan, the head of the political and information divisions at headquarters in Dublin, was sent as a delegate to the First Committee of the UN, involving him intensely in Aiken’s non-dissemination efforts. His insider account reveals some of the dynamics and calculations at play in the building, as Ireland managed a balancing act of engineering consensus between East and West. In large part, the Irish Mission crafted the resolution’s language to skirt the issue of alliance nuclear sharing in a bid to manufacture unanimity. The Irish had pondered co-sponsoring a Swedish draft resolution but anticipated that it would face resistance from NATO comparable to earlier iterations of the Irish resolution. Similarly, Ireland neglected to mention a proposed new disarmament committee in the draft resolution – there was no guarantee that it would form and report expeditiously. Finally, by drawing on the instrument of acclamation, the Irish sidestepped French objections and gained universal approval for Resolution 1665 (1961), wrapping the resolution in universal legitimacy. 

March 14, 1961

Memorandum to All Missions by the Department of External Affairs, ‘Arms Control’ (Confidential) (408/264B), Dublin

The arrival of the new U.S. president, John F. Kennedy, in office in 1961 encouraged Aiken to redouble his efforts. He searched for signs of change in the Kennedy administration. He was nevertheless guarded,  appreciating that the arms control ambitions of the United States did not necessarily or completely align with Ireland’s disarmament aspirations. He understood that progress required educating public opinion to recognize that general and complete disarmament could, given the vested interests, take generations. A step-by-step, gradualist approach therefore had to be adopted. He reiterated his philosophy of expanding areas of law, adopting a regionalist approach, and assuming a preventive orientation in a commentary on Kennedy’s article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in November 1960, which was itself based on Kennedy's campaign speech earlier that year.

June 14, 1994

State Minister Schmidbauer's Meeting with Iran's Foreign Minister Velayati on 13 June 1994 at the Chancellor’s Office

Schmidbauer and Velayati discuss the release of a German prisoner in Iran as a precondition for Germany's support of Iran's request for closer association with the European Community.

February 18, 1994

Meeting between Head of Department 2 [Joachim Bitterlich] and Iranian Ambassador Mousavian on 17 February 1994

Bitterlich and Mousavian review the state of bilateral relations and the importance of debt rescheduling for Iran. Bitterlich requests a more constructive Iranian role in the search for peace in the Middle East. Both discuss schemes for regional security and the CSCE process as a role model for the establishment of new multilateral security institutions in the Middle East.

February 3, 1994

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Lunch Meeting with President Clinton in Washington on 31 January 1994

Kohl and Clinton review the state of NATO enlargement after the January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels. They view NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) as the best solution to engage Russia and to reach out to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Both view the situation in Ukraine as a key factor in the search for Europe's post-Cold War order. "If anything happened in Ukraine, this would increase the pressure for the NATO accession of the Central and Eastern European countries," Clinton says.

Pagination