According to the Polish ambassador, Moscow’s goal to install missile launchers in Cuba was not completely clear. The explanation given by the Soviet Deputy Premier Sergei Mikoyan that Moscow wanted to use the missiles to obtain a guarantee for Cuba had obvious holes, Jeleń argued. To him, the Soviet move seemed more like a political ploy than military strategy. Warsaw’s emissary in Havana concluded his critical observations by stating that the Soviet Union did not make a mistake in withdrawing the missiles as the Cubans suggested but rather by installing them in the first place.

Czechoslovak diplomats in Havana inform Prague of the Soviet envoy’s admission that the threat of US-sponsored counter-revolution left Castro with no other choice but to turn to Marx and Lenin and to rely on the help of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries

The head of the Czechoslovak intelligence observed that the interruption of diplomatic relations with the US in January 1961 brought the immediate danger of military aggression against Cuba.

In a 1961 top secret report, the Soviet embassy painted a very dire situation on the island with US-backed counter-revolutionary forces gaining momentum

Cardenas asks Khrushchev about his position on peacekeeping and requests support to help Mexico's economic and industrial growth. Khrushchev emphasizes the importance of unity and preserving peace against a shift in US foreign policy toward economic and cultural competition as opposed to outright power competition. 

The two sides first discuss the aggression of the USA, England, and France towards the Arab nations over natural resources. The two sides then discuss bilateral relations and affairs in the Middle East.

Khrushchev and Indian Ambassador T. N. Kaul met again to discuss the ongoing Sino-Indian conflict. Kaul reiterated India’s request for Soviet military support, emphasizing the threat posed by China despite the recent Chinese ceasefire proposal. Khrushchev reaffirmed the Soviet Union’s commitment to a peaceful resolution and warned against escalating militarization but confirmed that the USSR would proceed with the planned construction of an aircraft plant in India and the delivery of MiG-21 aircraft. The conversation also addressed Soviet-Chinese relations, with Khrushchev denying any military aid to China and expressing regret over the conflict between two countries friendly to the USSR. Both sides agreed on the importance of negotiations while acknowledging ongoing challenges to achieving a lasting settlement.

Indian Ambassador T. N. Kaul met with Khrushchev to discuss the conflict between India and China, which India views as Chinese aggression. Kaul conveyed India’s desire to end the conflict while expressing concern over China's military advantage. He requested Soviet weapons support to strengthen India’s defense and demonstrate balanced international backing. Khrushchev declined, stating that the USSR seeks only a peaceful resolution and does not wish to escalate the conflict by supplying arms. He emphasized that negotiations are the only solution and reaffirmed the Soviet Union's neutral stance. Kaul also requested continued Soviet support for non-military assistance, such as transport aircraft and pilot training, which Khrushchev agreed to consider.

Khrushchev and Ho Chi Minh discuss global tensions around imperialism, nuclear disarmament, and peace talks over Germany. They review worsening Soviet relations with Albania and China, as Albania aligns with Beijing and Western powers. The leaders also address the conflicts in Laos and South Vietnam, balancing support for revolutionary forces with concerns over provoking US intervention.

Pham informs Khrushchev of the various independence movements in Asia, such as the politics of Laos, and in Vietnam. He then debriefs Khrushchev about the relations between Vietnamese intelligentsia and the Communist Party. With regards to Communists in China, the two parties discuss the failure of the communes project.