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Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Pyongyang photographed in March 20212

East Asia

North Korea

Emir Farid Chehab

Emir Farid Chehab Collection

Gyeongbokgung

East Asia

South Korea

Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

Central America and Caribbean

Cuba

Sino-Soviet Relations

Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Portrait of Mao Zedong from propaganda poster

Mao, Zedong

1893 - 1976

Press Briefing by Permanent Observer of Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the UN, 7 July 1976.

Inter-Korean Relations

Sino-Soviet Split, 1960-1984

Dr. Syngman Rhee, 1939

Syngman Rhee Era

Photograph of Zhou Enlai in 1972.

Zhou, Enlai

1898 - 1976

A photo of Joseph Stalin from 1943

Stalin, Joseph

1879 - 1953

Aerial photograph of CIA headquarters

United States. Central Intelligence Agency

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Dr. Syngman Rhee, 1939

Rhee, Syngman

1875 - 1965

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Puzanov, A. M.

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Documents

April 20, 1960	Record of a Conversation [between] Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Walter Nash, Prime Minister of New Zealand, on the Shore of the Caucasus (Pitsunda) This record of a conversation between Nikita Khrushchev and New Zealand Prime Minister Walter Nash, held on April 20, 1960, covers various international issues, including disarmament, the Cold War, German reunification, and the status of West Berlin. Nash praises Khrushchev’s peace proposals and emphasizes the importance of disarmament and peaceful coexistence. Khrushchev reiterates the Soviet Union's commitment to disarmament but expresses frustration with Western nations' resistance to concrete agreements. The two leaders discuss the need for mutual trust and the challenge of resolving intricate diplomatic issues. Khrushchev outlines Soviet plans for Germany, advocating peace treaties with both East and West Germany while proposing that West Berlin become a "free city." The conversation ends with Khrushchev agreeing to review cases of New Zealand residents seeking to reunite with family in the USSR. Both leaders express mutual respect and appreciation for the dialogue. This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.
August 10, 1959	Comments of N.S. Khrushchev In this document, N. S. Khrushchev provides wide-ranging comments on various geopolitical and diplomatic issues. He criticizes the US for holding onto outdated alliances like Taiwan, emphasizing the need to normalize relations and reduce tensions globally. Khrushchev discusses Middle Eastern instability, particularly in Iran, warning against U.S. interference and emphasizing self-determination for colonized nations. He also addresses disarmament, arguing that military bases are a source of tension and advocating for a phased withdrawal of troops and arms control measures. Additional topics include the complexities of summit diplomacy, Lend-Lease repayment disputes, and his correspondence with world leaders such as Macmillan, De Gaulle, and Nehru, stressing the importance of aligning messages to maintain good relations. This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.
August 10, 1959	N.S. Khrushchev’s Views on the Content of a Memorandum [about a Peace Treaty with Germany] N. S. Khrushchev outlines his perspective on negotiating with the United States regarding a peace treaty with Germany, emphasizing the need to address the division between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). He critiques Western policies that led to Germany's division and proposes signing a peace treaty with the GDR, while reassuring the U.S. that this action is not a threat to West Berlin. Khrushchev also touches on broader geopolitical issues, such as parallels with divided Korea and Vietnam, the significance of trade as a diplomatic barometer, and the importance of resolving tensions surrounding Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. Throughout, he encourages a phased approach to negotiations, stressing mutual understanding to avoid exacerbating international tensions. This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.
June 17, 1980	Confidential Note from M.G. Roberts (Joint Nuclear Unit) to Sir A. Acland, 'Panorama Documentary on Pakistan Nuclear Programme' The FCO’s Joint Nuclear Unit (JNU) assessed the Panorama documentary as correct in broad terms, but speculative and inaccurate in most details. Analysts contended that the most significant allegation was that of the Libyan/‘Islamic’ bomb, but that there was still no substantive evidence that Libya had provided finance or that Pakistan had agreed to proliferate. Anonymous allegations in the documentary were said to be ‘sensational’ but carried ‘little conviction’.
June 18, 1980	Confidential Note from R.D. Lavers (South Asia Department) to Mr. Roberts (Joint Nuclear Unit), 'Pakistan Nuclear: Panorama Programme, 16 June
June 16, 1980	Transcript of BBC Panorama Television Program, 'Project 706: the Islamic Bomb' From early 1979 onwards, media coverage of the "Islamic bomb" became ever more prominent. In Mid-June 1980, the BBC's prestigious Panorama investigative strand aired "Project 706: The Islamic Bomb," that seemingly underscored alleged Pakistani-Libyan connections, uranium supplied by Niger, the complicity of British, German, Italian, and Swiss industry, and the threat of pan-Islamic nuclear proliferation. Reporter Philip Tibenham opened by alarmingly informing viewers that: "This convoy grinding across the empty Sahara is carrying what could be the raw material for the world’s first nuclear war …. It’s been mined in the Islamic state of Niger. It’ll be flown on to Islamic Libya; then on to Islamic Pakistan. Tonight, Panorama reports exclusively on payments of millions of pounds by Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi to finance Pakistan’s efforts to build the ‘Islamic bomb’."
December 7, 1984	Chief of the Pasvalys Regional Branch of the KGB of the Lithuanian SSR Lt. Colonel S. Saveikis, 'A Plan for the Individual Training of a Young Officer of the State Security Service' This document provides a set of instructions concerning the matters that a newly-recruited state security officer who has not gone through the Chekist educational system needs to know in order to perform his Chekist duties in the successful manner.
March 23, 1979	Cabinet Ministerial Group on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Programme: Pressures and Inducements' This report, created in March 1979 by the Ministerial Group on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, explores the state of Pakistan’s nuclear program. The document also explores topics like Pakistan’s political status among its neighbors in the Arab world, as well as possible ways Pakistan could be induced to terminate its nuclear activities. In the face of alarmists such as Arthur Hummel in the US and Anthony Parsons in the UK, the influential British analysts on the Ministerial Group on Nuclear Non-proliferation thought it unlikely that Arab countries would knowingly fund Pakistan's nuclear programme, even though it was suggested many Muslim states might welcome a co-religionist achieving the ‘ultimate technological feat’. For nations such as Saudi Arabia, relations with the West were situated as far more significant than connections with Islamabad, despite Pakistan's position as a bulwark between the Muslim world and the USSR. The group suggested enlisting Arab governments in order to put pan-Islamic pressure on Pakistan, arguing that security concerns related to India – and not a desire to equip the Muslim world with a ‘nuclear sword’ – were the nuclear programme's main drivers. Addressing Islamabad’s security issues – a constant in British and American discussions about Pakistan – represented the surest way of achieving positive results. Where the pan-Islamic issue might come into play – analysts suggested – was after any Pakistani nuclear test, where Islamabad might enlist Muslim countries to help resist Western pressure to give up ‘the first nuclear weapon to be developed in a Moslem country.'
January 8, 1968	Information about the Work of the 4th Department of the 2nd Directorate on the Preparation and Implementation of the Chekist Active Measures against the Intelligence Services of the FRG from Counterintelligence Positions in 1967. An annual report covering the work of the 4th Department of the Lithuanian KGB counterintelligence directorate, which was tasked with counterintelligence activities in the Federal Republic of Germany, in 1967.
April 21, 1967	Colonel V. Konoplenko to the Chief of the 1st Department and the Department Chiefs of the 2nd Directorate of the KGB of the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR Deputy Chairman Colonel V. Konoplenko describes the counterintelligence operation known as HORIZON in general terms and tasks the Lithuanian KGB and its branches with specific counterintelligence tasks.

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South Korea 1931

Emir Farid Chehab Collection 1952

Sino-Soviet Relations 860

Cuban Missile Crisis 706

Inter-Korean Relations 435

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