Minutes from the Meeting of the Political Committee on June 13, 1972

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!

Made: in 2 copies

MINUTES

from the meeting of the Political Committee on June 13, 1972

1./ Report on Fidel Castro's visit to Hungary

Comrade JÁNOS KÁDÁR:

I believe that Castro's visit gave a better-than-usual insight into the problems of the Cuban brotherhood. Many interesting and important things arose during the negotiations, which are also described in the report. Therefore, this report does not need much addition. I would like to mention three small things:

The Cuban comrades used to take a very sharp, wrong position on international issues in the past. Something in which we, as a communist party, are also interested. For example, the question of the old communists, then the question of power-hungry Latin American parties, etc.

We do not know exactly the internal leadership system of the Cuban comrades.

The raising of these certain former controversial issues was striking and good. He was thoughtful and honest. For example, Castro spoke very politically and well about the old communists, the communist party before the unification, and his own group. Correctly. This gives a certain experience, of course. He explained what the situation was like in Cuba before the revolution. He said that there were two progressive organized forces: the Communist Party and one made up of radical movement of university students, who considered themselves Marxists,

(p. 1 [f. 131.R])

but were not in a party. He called themselves neo-communists. He said the Communist Party's analysis, which cannot simply be called a bad analysis based on classical forms, concluded that there is no revolutionary situation in Cuba. This was true to the extent that, according to classical definitions, it was not really a revolutionary situation. There is neither an economic crisis nor any other crisis that creates a revolutionary situation according to the classical forms, they judged that the society is so free from them, that the situation is ripe for a revolutionary action to be launched. And that's how what they did there started. He explained that when power actually came into their hands, their revolution was not socialist. They had demands, land reform, and other bourgeois-democratic revolutionary demands. He was not a socialist. He also vividly described this process. He said that when the government was in their hands, they had no connection with any socialist country. Cuba was a dependency of the United States. As the imperialists oppressed them, step by step they turned to the socialist countries, the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union helped them. this is how the revolution in Cuba developed into a socialist revolution, almost unconsciously. Many things helped us understand each other better.

I mentioned that the classic situation is that the party often makes mistakes. It's hard to demand self-criticism here when he can explain the process. He mentioned: what is their pride that the revolution took place in such a complicated manner, in the midst of disputes.

It was important that they discussed the Caribbean crisis in a similar spirit. Castro said: the matter for them started when a Soviet marshal approached him, started negotiating with them, and offered them the missiles: they were ready to give missiles in order to protect the Cuban revolution. They said they would investigate and came to the conclusion that the interests of the Cuban revolution did not require missiles, they did not need them, and they could fight in other ways. Afterwards,

(p. 2 [f. 132.R])

the question was raised in such a way that it would also serve to protect the entire socialist world. Then this was discussed again, and the Political Committee discussed it for two days. They decided that if the interests of the socialist world demanded it, it had to be done. They told the Soviet comrades: come on, they can bring up to a thousand rockets. Now, after this, one understands this matter better. The point is that the withdrawal was made without consulting them. This is the story from their side. This is also very important for the future.

At various stages of the negotiation, all the socialist countries were involved - China, Romania, Yugoslavia, etc. I am not saying that they are judged by a hair's breadth in the same way as our party, but I dare say that there is no perceptible, serious difference. Of course, they are sharper than we are on the Yugoslav issue, they also have the same problem with Romania, perhaps they are a shade sharper here too.

One more question: the vision of the Cuban party, the Cuban leadership judging their own role, one could still feel the consciousness of a mission-role. This is much more powerful for them than usual. They have a certain sense of mission. They work for the Cuban people, for socialism, but they also have an important role in revolutionizing Latin America. The organizational change that happened here is very good. In Latin America, they consider all currents and tendencies to be good and support them, which are actually anti-imperialist, they do not insist only on armed insurrection.

From this basic position follows the different positions on some issues. They explained this in the following way: - there was little discussion about this - if they sit down to negotiate with the US government, they demand that the US renounce its role as an international gendarmerie. They returned to this several times in their speech. Their resolutions also have a certain symbolic power in Latin America.

The Yugoslav-Romanian position, which is more irritated than ours, is related to the same thing. This is the ambivalent relationship to imperialism. If this perception were to gain ground, it would represent a serious danger.

(p. 3 [f. 133.R])

That's why they judge Nixon's Polish reception more sharply. As for the Muscovites, they accepted it, it was considered necessary. They trust the Soviet Union in this matter as well. But the Poles' reception of Nixon was extremely harsh.

Comrade GYULA KÁLLAI;

The material mentions in two places that there was a decline in their relationship with the Soviet Union. I think the reason for this is not only the Cuban crisis but also what followed.

Did they say anything more about the assessment of the combat situation on the South American continent? What caused the South American peoples' fighting methods to be judged in this way after the Cuban crisis - now they see it noticeably differently.

Comrade APRÓ ANTAL:

The situation regarding the installation of missiles is now clear. If I remember correctly, the discussions with the Soviet Union started when the missiles were dismantled. Did they say anything about that?

Comrade ÁRPÁD PULLAI:

Has it been discussed in some form that the party's situation is characterized by the fact that no congress is held, the members of the Central Committee are appointed, and functionaries are usually appointed? Did they say anything about this?

Comrade VALERIA BERKE:

Was there talk of their relationship with the Latin American communist parties or its distortion?

Comrade JÁNOS KÁDÁR:

There was no mention of party issues, neither of the congress, nor of the appointed functionaries, nor of the Latin American communist parties in an international context.

(p. 4 [f. 134.R])

By the way, in this context, I will mention how during the preliminary negotiations we worked with our usual names: party and government, etc. It was not like that on their part. Their name read: Fidel Castro's visit and visit. The negotiations went on in the same way, he never said that it was our party, our central committee, or our government. He always said: we'll see. The Cuban boycott, the severance of relations, etc. ceased, contact was established, they negotiated, and talked, and the Latin American revolution is a common cause. Here, the relationship is improving and normalizing.

To Comrade Kállai's question: they talked about their own domestic plans. They said that they also had objective difficulties, so it was not specifically discussed in this context. Experience makes revolutionaries.

To Comrade Apró's question: what they said is true that was also the meaning. They wanted to convey that they did not even think of acquiring rockets for their own fight. It was explained to them that this was necessary, and when it was dismantled, it hurt them.

About the Latin American mission: we experienced a realistic approach to almost every issue. In this regard, they also talked about the distant future. Quite realistically. They said that 10-15 years are needed to solve the issues of internal development. They explained that they cannot exist and stand on their own two feet alone; international help and cooperation are needed. They imagine that there will be a unit in the world that they call: progressive revolutionary Latin America, they will belong there and not to North America. Their language is Spanish, and so is their culture, etc. It was said that in the current phase, close cooperation with the socialist countries must be built up in the economic field as well as in other fields of cooperation until world development reaches the point where this unity is achieved. Quite a few convincing arguments were made to support this, and there was a lot of common sense in it. This will be the result of

(p. 5 [f. 135.R])

a long struggle.

Comrade BÉLA BİSKU :

Let's accept the report and the proposed resolution. I think point 4 is to be understood as: the information is prepared based on the basic material, and no separate annex is included.

Comrade ZOLTÁN KOMÓČIN:

I recommend that we give the basic report to the Soviet comrades, for information. Comrade Marjai should be given the opportunity, if GDR and Czechoslovakia are interested, to provide information about the essence orally.

Comrade JÁNOS KADAR:

I recommend that PB does not take a position on "technique". Comrade Zoltán Komócsin is responsible for informing the SZKP [CPSS] in detail. The other partners are also informed, if necessary.

Recorded by:

/Gyuláné Takács/

(p. 6 [f. 136.R])